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Abstract. Symbolic models for security protocol verification, following the sem-
inal ideas of Dolev and Yao, come in many flavors, even though they share the
same ideas. A common assumption is that the attacker has complete control over
the network: he can therefore intercept any message. Depending on the precise
model this may be reflected either by the fact that any protocol output is directly
routed to the adversary, or communications may be among any two participants,
including the attacker — the scheduling between which exact parties the com-
munication happens is left to the attacker. These two models may seem equiv-
alent at first glance and, depending on the verification tools, either one or the
other semantics is implemented. We show that, unsurprisingly, they indeed coin-
cide for reachability properties. However, when we consider indistinguishability
properties, we prove that these two semantics are incomparable. We also intro-
duce a new semantics, where internal communications are allowed but messages
are always eavesdropped by the attacker. We show that this new semantics yields
strictly stronger equivalence relations. We also identify two subclasses of proto-
cols for which the three semantics coincide. Finally, we implemented verification
of trace equivalence for each of these semantics in the APTE tool and compare
their performances on several classical examples.
1 Introduction
Automated, symbolic analysis of security protocols, based on the seminal ideas of
Dolev and Yao, comes is many variants. All of these models however share a few fun-
damental ideas:
– messages are represented as abstract terms,
– adversaries are computationally unbounded, but may manipulate messages only
according to pre-defined rules (this is sometimes referred to as the perfect cryptog-
raphy assumption), and
– the adversary completely controls the network.
In this paper we will revisit this last assumption. Looking more precisely at different
models we observe that this assumption may actually slightly differ among the models.
The fact that the adversary controls the network is supposed to represent a worst case
assumption.
In some models this assumption translates to the fact that every protocol output is
sent to the adversary, and every protocol input is provided by the adversary. This is the
case in the original Dolev Yao model and also in the models underlying several tools,
such as AVISPA [6], Scyther [13], Tamarin [20], Millen and Shmatikov’s constraint
solver [17], and the model used in Paulson’s inductive approach [18].
Some other models, such as those based on process algebras, e.g. work based on
CSP [19], the Spi [3] and applied pi calculus [1], but also the strand space model [21],
consider a slightly different communication model: any two agents may communicate.
Scheduling whether communication happens among two honest participants, or a hon-
est participant and the attacker is under the attacker’s control.
When considering reachability properties, these two communication models indeed
coincide: intuitively, any internal communication could go through the adversary who
acts as a relay and increases his knowledge by the transmitted message. However, when
considering indistinguishability properties, typically modelled as process equivalences,
these communication models diverge. Interestingly, when forbidding internal commu-
nication, i.e., forcing all communication to be relayed by the attacker, we may weaken
the attacker’s distinguishing power.
In many recent work privacy properties have been modelled using process equiva-
lences, see for instance [14, 5, 15]. The number of tools able to verify such properties
is also increasing [9, 22, 11, 10]. We have noted that for instance the AKISS tool [10]
does not allow any direct communication on public channels, while the APTE tool [11]
allows the user to choose among the two semantics. One motivation for disallowing di-
rect communication is that it allows for more efficient verification (as less actions need
to be considered and the number of interleavings to be considered is smaller).
Our contributions. We have formalised three semantics in the applied pi calculus which
differ by the way communication is handled:
– the classical semantics (as in the original applied pi calculus) allows both internal
communication among honest participants and communication with the adversary;
– a private semantics allows internal communication only on private channels while
all communication on public channels is routed through the adversary;
– an eavesdropping semantics which allows internal communication, but as a side-
effect adds the transmitted message to the adversary’s knowledge.
For each of the new semantics we define may-testing and observational equiva-
lences. We also define corresponding labelled semantics and trace equivalence and
bisimulation relations (which may serve as proof techniques).
We show that, as expected, the three semantics coincide for reachability proper-
ties. For equivalence properties we show that the classical and private semantics yield
incomparable equivalences, while the eavesdropping semantics yields strictly stronger
equivalence relations than both other semantics. The results are summarized in Figure 7.
An interesting question is whether these semantics coincide for specific subclasses
of processes. We first note that the processes that witness the differences in the seman-
tics do not use replication, private channels, nor terms other than names, and no equa-
tional theory. Moreover, all except one of these examples only use trivial else branches
(of the form else 0); the use of a non-trivial else branch can however be avoided by
allowing a single free symbol.
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However conditions on the channel names may yield such a subclass. We first ob-
serve that the class of simple processes [12], for which already observational, testing,
trace equivalence and labelled bisimulation coincide, do have this property. Simple pro-
cesses may however be too restrictive for modelling some protocols that should guar-
antee anonymity (as no parallel processes may share channel names). We therefore
identify a syntactic class of processes, that we call I/O-unambiguous. For this class we
forbid communication on private channels, communication of channel names and an
output may not be sequentially followed by an input on the same channel directly, or
with only conditionals in between. Note that I/O-unambiguous processes do however
allow outputs and inputs on the same channel in parallel. We show that for this class the
eavesdropping semantics (which is the most strict relation) coincides with the private
one (which is the most efficient for verification).
Finally, we have extended the APTE tool to support verification of trace equivalence
for the three semantics. Verifying existing protocols in the APTE example repository
we verified that the results, fortunately, coincided for each of the semantics. We also
made slight changes to the encodings, renaming some channels, to make them I/O-
unambiguous. Interestingly, using different channels, significantly increased the perfor-
mance of the tool. Finally, we also observed that, as expected, the private semantics
yields more efficient verification. The results of our experiments are summarized in
Figure ??.
Outline. In Section 2 we define the three semantics we consider. In Section 3 we present
our main results on comparing these semantics. We present subclasses for which (some)
semantics coincide in Section 4 and compare the performances when verifying proto-
cols for different semantics using APTE in Section 5, before concluding in Section 6.
Because of lack of space we did not include all proofs. Missing proofs are available
in an extended [7].
2 Model
The applied pi calculus [1] is a variant of the pi calculus that is specialised for modelling
cryptographic protocols. Participants in a protocol are modelled as processes and the
communication between them is modelled by message passing on channels. In this
section, we describe the syntax and semantics of the applied pi calculus as well as the
two new variants that we study in this paper.
2.1 Syntax
We consider an infinite set N of names of base type and an infinite set Ch of names of
channel type. We also consider an infinite set of variables X of base type and channel
type and a signature F consisting of a finite set of function symbols. We rely on a sort
system for terms. In particular, the sort base type differs from the sort channel type.
Moreover, any function symbol can only be applied and returns base type terms. We
define terms as names, variables and function symbols applied to other terms. Given
N ⊆ N , X ⊆ X and F ⊆ F , we denote by T (F,X,N) the sets of terms built from
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X and N by applying function symbols from F . We denote fv(t) the sets of variables
occurring in t. We say that t is ground if fv(t) = ∅. We describe the behaviour of
cryptographic primitives by the means of an equational theory E that is a relation on
terms closed under substitutions of terms for variables and closed under one-to-one
renaming. Given two terms u and v, we write u =E v when u and v are equal modulo
the equational theory.
In the original syntax of the applied pi calculus, there is no distinction between an
output (resp. input) from a protocol participant and from the environment, also called
the attacker. In this paper however, we will make this distinction in order to concisely
present our new variants of the semantics. Therefore, we consider two process tags
ho and at that respectively represent honest and attacker actions. The syntax of plain
processes and extended processes is given in Figure 1.
P,Q := 0 plain processes A,B := P extended processes
P | Q A | B
!P νn.A
νn.P νx.A
if u = v then P else Q {u/x}
inθ(c, x).P ωc
outθ(c, u).P
eav(c, x).P
where u and v are base type terms, n is a name, x is a variable and c is a name or variable of
channel type, θ is a tag, i.e. θ ∈ {ho, at}.
Fig. 1. Syntax of processes
The process outθ(c, u) represents the output by θ of the message u on the channel c.
The process inθ(c, x) represents an input by θ on the channel c. The input message will
instantiate the variable x. The process eav(c, x) models the capability of the attacker to
eavesdrop a communication on channel c. The process !P represents the replication of
the process P , i.e. unbounded number of copies of P . The process P | Q represents
the parallel composition of P and Q. The process νn.P (resp. νx.A) is the restriction
of the name n in P (resp. variable x in A). The process if u = v then P else Q is
the conditional branching under the equality test u = v. The process ωc records that
a private channel c has been opened, i.e., it has been sent on a public or previously
opened channel. Finally, the substitution {u/x} is an active substitution that replaces
the variable x with the term u of base type.
We say that a process P (resp. extended process A) is an honest process (resp.
honest extended process) when all inputs and outputs in P (resp. A) are tagged with ho
and when P (resp. A) does not contain eavesdropping processes and ωc. We say that
a process P (resp. extended process A) is an attacker process (resp. attacker extended
process) when all inputs and outputs in P (resp. A) are tagged with at.
As usual, names and variables have scopes which are delimited by restrictions, in-
puts and eavesdrops. We denote fv(A), bv(A), fn(A), bn(A) the sets of free variables,
bound variables, free names and bound names respectively in A. Moreover, we denote
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by oc(A) the sets of terms c of channel type opened in A, i.e. that occurs in a process
ωc. We say that an extended process A is closed when all variables in A are either
bound or defined by an active substitution in A. We define an evaluation context C[ ]
as an extended process with a hole instead of an extended process. As for processes,
we define an attacker evaluation context as an evaluation context where all outputs and
inputs in the context are tagged with at.
Note that our syntax without the eavesdropping process, opened channels and tags
correspond exactly to the syntax of the original applied pi calculus.
Lastly, we consider the notion of frame that are extended processes built from 0,
parallel composition, name and variable restrictions and active substitution. Given a
frame ϕ, we consider the domain of ϕ, denoted dom(ϕ), as the set of free variables in
ϕ that are defined by an active substitution in ϕ. Given an extended processA, we define
the frame of A, denoted φ(A), as the process A where we replace all plain processes by
0. Finally, we write dom(A) as syntactic sugar for dom(φ(A)).
2.2 Operational semantics
In this section, we define the three semantics that we study in this paper, namely:
– the classical semantics from the applied pi calculus, where internal communication
can occur on both public and private channels;
– the private semantics where internal communication can only occur on private
channels; and
– the eavesdropping semantics where the attacker is able to eavesdrop on a public
channel.
We first define the structural equivalence between extended processes, denoted ≡,
as the smallest equivalence relation on extended processes that is closed under renaming
of names and variables, closed by application of evaluation contexts, that is associative
and commutative w.r.t. |, and such that:
A ≡ A | 0 !P ≡ !P | P νn.0 ≡ 0
νi.νj.A ≡ νj.νi.A νx.{u/x} ≡ 0 {u/x} | A ≡ {u/x} | A{u/x}
A | νi.B ≡ νi.(A | B) when i 6∈ fv(A) ∪ fn(A) ωc ≡ ωc | ωc
{u/x} ≡ {v/x} when u =E v
The three operational semantics of extended processes are defined by the struc-
tural equivalence and by three respective internal reductions, denoted→c,→p and→e.
These three reductions are the smallest relations on extended processes that are closed
under application of evaluation context, structural equivalence and such that:
if u = v then P else Q
τ−→s Pwhere u =E v and s ∈ {c, p, e} THEN
if u = v then P else Q
τ−→s Q ELSE
where u, v ground, u 6=E v and s ∈ {c, p, e}
outθ(c, u).P | inθ
′
(c, x).Q
τ−→c P | Q{u/x} COMM
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νc.(outθ(c, u).P | inθ
′
(c, x).Q | R) τ−→s νc.(P | Q{u/x} | R) C-PRIV
where c 6∈ oc(R) and s ∈ {p, e}
outθ(c, u).P | inθ
′
(c, x).Q
τ−→s P | Q{u/x} C-ENV
at ∈ {θ, θ′}, u is of base type and s ∈ {p, e}
outθ(c, d).P | inθ
′
(c, x).Q
τ−→s P | Q{d/x} | ωd C-OPEN
at ∈ {θ, θ′}, d is of channel type and s ∈ {p, e}
outho(c, u).P | inho(c, x).Q | eav(c, y).R τ−→e P | Q{u/x} | R{u/y} C-EAV
where u is of base type
outho(c, d).P | inho(c, x).Q | eav(c, y).R τ−→e P | Q{d/x} | R{d/y} | ωd C-OEAV
where d is of channel type
We emphasise that the application of the rule is closed under application of arbitrary
evaluation contexts. In particular the context may restrict channels, e.g. the rule C-
OPEN may be used under the context νc. resulting in a private channel c, but with the
attacker input/output being in the scope of this restriction. It follows from the definition
of evaluation contexts that the resulting processes are always well defined. We denote
by ⇒s the reflexive, transitive closure of
τ−→s for s ∈ {c, p, e}. We note that the clas-
sical semantics τ−→c is independent of the tags θ, θ′, the eavesdrop actions and the ωc
processes.
Example 1. Consider the process
A = (νd.outθ(c, d).inθ(d, x).P ) | (inθ
′
(c, y).outθ
′
(y, t).Q)
where d is a channel name and t a term of base type. Suppose θ = θ′ = ho then we have
that communication is only possible in the classical semantics (using twice the COMM
rule):
A
τ−→c νd.(inθ(d, x).P | outθ
′
(d, t).Q{d/y})
τ−→c νd.(P{t/x} | Q{d/y})
while no transitions are available in the two other semantics. To enable communication
in the eavesdropping semantics we need to explicitly add eavesdrop actions. Applying
the rules C-OEAV and C-EAV we have that
A | eav(c, z1).eav(z1, z2).R
τ−→e νd.(inθ(d, x).P | outθ
′
(d, t).Q{d/y}
| eav(d, z2).R{d/z1} | ωd)
τ−→e νd.(P{t/x} | Q{d/y} | R{d/z1}{t/z2} | ωd)
We note that the first transition adds the information ωd to indicate that d is now avail-
able to the environment.
Finally, if we consider that at ∈ θ, θ′ then internal communication on a public
channel is possible and, using rules C-OPEN and C-ENV we obtain for s ∈ {p, e} that
A
τ−→s νd.(inθ(d, x).P | outθ
′
(d, t).Q{d/y} | ωd)
τ−→s νd.(P{t/x} | Q{d/y} | ωd)
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2.3 Reachability and behavioural equivalences
We are going to compare the relation between the three semantics for the two general
kind of security properties, namely reachability properties encoding security proper-
ties such as secrecy, authentication, and equivalence properties encoding anonymity,
unlinkability, strong secrecy, receipt freeness, . . . . Intuitively, reachability properties
encode that a process cannot reach some bad state. Equivalences define the fact that no
attacker can distinguish two processes. This was originally defined by the (may)-testing
equivalence [3] in the spi-calculus. An alternate equivalence, which was considered in
the applied pi calculus [1], is observational equivalence.
Reachability properties can simply be encoded by verifying the capability of a pro-
cess to perform an output on a given cannel. We define A ⇓s,θc to hold when A =⇒s
C[outθ(c, t).P ] for some evaluation context C that does not bind c, some term t and
some plain process P , and A ⇓sc to hold when A ⇓s,θc for some θ ∈ {at, ho}. For ex-
ample the secrecy of s in the process νs.A can be encoded by checking whether for all
attacker plain process I , we have that
I | νs.(A | inho(c, x).if x = s then outho(bad, s)) 6⇓s,hobad
where bad 6∈ fn(A).
Authentication properties are generally expressed as correspondence properties be-
tween events annotating processes, see e.g. [8]. A correspondence property between two
events begin and end, denoted begin⇐ end, requires that the event end is preceded by
the event begin on every trace. A possible encoding of this correspondence property
consists in first replacing all instances of the events in A by outputs outho(ev, begin)
and outho(ev, end) where ev 6∈ fn(A) ∪ bn(A). This new process A′ can then be put
in parallel with a cell Cell that reads on the channel ev and stores any new value un-
less the value is end and the current stored value in the cell is not begin. In such a
case, the cell will output on the channel bad. The correspondance property can there-
fore be encoded by checking whether for all attacker plain process I , we have that
I | νev.(A′ | Cell) 6⇓s,hobad .
We say that an attacker evaluation context C[ ] is c-closing for an extended process
A if fv(C[A]) = ∅. For s ∈ {p, e}, we say that C[ ] is s-closing for A if it is c-
closing for A, variables and names are bound only once in C[ ] and for all channels
c ∈ bn(C[ ]) ∩ fn(A), if the scope of c includes then the scope of c also includes ωc.
We next introduce the two main notions of behavioural equivalences: may testing
and observational equivalence.
Definition 1 ((May-)Testing equivalences ≈cm, ≈pm, ≈em). Let s ∈ {c, p, e}. Let A
and B two closed honest extended processes such that dom(A) = dom(B). We say
that A ≈sm B if for all attacker evaluation contexts C[ ] s-closing for A and B, for all
channels c, we have that C[A] ⇓sc if and only if C[B] ⇓sc.
Definition 2 (Observational equivalences ≈co, ≈po, ≈eo). Let s ∈ {c, p, e}. Let A and
B two closed extended processes such that dom(A) = dom(B). We say that A ≈sm B
if ≈sm is the largest equivalence relation such that:
– A ⇓sc implies B ⇓sc;
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– A τ−→s A′ implies B
ε
=⇒s B′ and A′ ≈sm B′ for some B′;
– C[A] ≈sm C[B] for all attacker evaluation contexts C[ ] s-closing for A and B.
For each of the semantics we have the usual relation between these two notions:
observational equivalence implies testing equivalence.
Proposition 1. ≈so ( ≈sm for s ∈ {c, e, p}.
Example 2. Consider processes A and B of Figure 2. Process A computes a value
hn(a) to be output on channel c, where hn(a) denotes n applications of h and h0(a) =
a. The value is initially a andAmay choose to either output the current value, or update
the current value by applying the free symbol h. B may choose non-deterministically
to either behave as A or output the fresh name s. (The non-deterministic choice is en-
coded by a communication on the private channel e which may be received by either
the process behaving as A or the process outputting s.)
We have thatA 6≈so B. The two processes can indeed be distinguished by the context
C[ ] =̂ | outat(ca, a) | !(inat(ca, x).outat(ca, h(x))
| inat(ca, y).inat(c, z).if y = z then outat(ct, h(x))
Intuitively, when B outputs s the attacker context C[ ] can iterate the application of h
the same number of times as would have done process A. Comparing the value com-
puted by the adversary (hn(a)) and the honestly computed value (either hn(a) or s) the
adversary distinguishes the two processes by outputting on the test channel ct.
However, we have that A ≈sm B. Indeed, for any s-closing context D[ ] and all
public channel ch we have thatD[A] ⇓sch if and only ifD[B] ⇓sch. In particular for con-
text C[ ] defined above we have that both C[A] ⇓sch and C[B] ⇓sch for ch ∈ {ca, ct, c}.
Unlike observational equivalence, may testing does not require to “mimick” the other
process stepwise and we cannot force a process into a particular branch.
A =̂ νd.outho(d, a) | !inho(d, x).outho(d, h(x)) | inho(d, y).outho(c, y)
B =̂ νe.outho(e, a) | inho(e, z).A | inho(e, z).νs.outho(c, s)
Fig. 2. Processes A and B such that A ≈sm B, but A 6≈so B and A 6≈st B for s ∈ {c, e, p} .
2.4 Labelled semantics
The internal reduction semantics introduced in the previous section requires to rea-
son about arbitrary contexts. Similar to the original applied pi calculus, we extend
the three operational semantics by a labeled operational semantics which allows pro-
cesses to directly interact with the (adversarial) environment: we define the relation
`−→c,
`−→p and
`−→e where ` is part of the alphabet A = {τ, out(c, d), eav(c, d), in(c, w),
νk.out(c, k), νk.eav(c, k) | c, d ∈ Ch, k ∈ X ∪ Ch and w is a term of any sort}. The
labeled rules are given in Figure 3.
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IN inho(c, y).P
in(c,t)−−−−→s P{t/y}
OUT-CH outho(c, d).P
out(c,d)−−−−−→s P
OPEN-CH
A
out(c,d)−−−−−→s A′ d 6= c
νd.A
νd.out(c,d)−−−−−−−→s A′
EAV-OCH
A
eav(c,d)−−−−−→e A′ d 6= c
νd.A
νd.eav(c,d)−−−−−−−→e A′
SCOPE
A
`−→s A′ u does not occur in `
νu.A
`−→s νu.A′
bn(`) ∩ fn(B) = ∅
PAR
A
`−→s A′ bv(`) ∩ fv(B) = ∅
A | B `−→s A′ | B
STRUCT
A ≡ B B `−→s B′ B′ ≡ A′
A
`−→s A′
EAV-CH outho(c, d).P | inho(c, x).Q eav(c,d)−−−−−→e P | Q{d/x}
EAV-T outho(c, t).P | inho(c, x).Q νy.eav(c,y)−−−−−−−→e P | Q{t/x} | {t/y}
OUT-T outho(c, t).P
νx.out(c,x)−−−−−−−→s P | {t/x}
x 6∈ fv(P ) ∪ fv(t)
where s ∈ {c, p, e}.
Fig. 3. Labeled semantics
Consider our alphabet of actionsA defined above. Given w ∈ A∗, s ∈ {c, p, e} and
an extended process A, we say that A w−→s An when A
`1−→s A1
`2−→s A2
`3−→s . . .
`n−→s
An for some extended processes A1, . . . , An and w = `1 · . . . · `n. By convention,
we say that A ε−→s A where ε is the empty word. Given tr ∈ (A \ {τ})∗, we say that
A
tr
=⇒s A′ when there exists w ∈ A∗ such that tr is the word w where we remove all τ
actions and A w−→s A′.
Example 3. Coming back to Example 1, we saw thatA τ−→c
τ−→c νd.(P{t/x} | Q{d/y})
and no τ -actions in the other two semantics were available. Instead of explicitly adding
eavesdrop actions, we can apply the rules EAV-OCH and EAV-T and obtain that
A
νd.eav(c,d)−−−−−−−→e inho(d, x).P | outho(d, t).Q{d/y})
νz.eav(d,z)−−−−−−−→e P{t/x} | Q{d/y} | {t/z}
We can now define both reachability and different equivalence properties in terms of
these labelled semantics and relate them to the internal reduction. To define reachability
properties in the labelled semantics, we define A sc to hold when A
tr
=⇒ A′, tr =
tr1out(c, t)tr2 and tr1 does not bind c for some tr, tr1, tr2 ∈ (A \ {τ})∗, term t and
extended process A′.
The following proposition states that any reachability property modelled in terms of
A ⇓s,θc and universal quantification over processes, can also be expressed using A sc
without the need to quantify over processes.
Proposition 2. For all closed honest plain processes A, for all s ∈ {c, e, p}, A sc iff
there exists an attacker plain process Is such that Is | A ⇓s,hoc .
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Next, we define equivalence relations using our labelled semantics that may serve as
proof techniques for the may testing relation. First we need to define an indistinguisha-
bility relation on frames, called static equivalence.
Definition 3 (Static equivalence ∼). Two terms u and v are equal in the frame φ,
written (u =E v)φ, if there exists ñ and a substitution σ such that φ ≡ νñ.σ, ñ ∩
(fn(u) ∪ fn(v)) = ∅, and uσ =E vσ.
Two closed frames φ1 and φ2 are statically equivalent, written φ1 ∼ φ2, when:
– dom(φ1) = dom(φ2), and
– for all terms u, v we have that: (u =E v)φ1 if and only if (u =E v)φ2.
Example 4. Consider the equational theory generated by the equation dec(enc(x, y), y) =
x. Then we have that
νk. {enc(a,k)/x1} ∼ νk. {enc(b,k)/x1}
νk. {enc(a,k)/x1 ,k /x2} 6∼ νk. {enc(b,k)/x1 ,k /x2}
νk, a. {enc(a,k)/x1 ,k /x2} ∼ νk, b. {enc(b,k)/x1 ,k /x2}
Intutively, the first equivalence confirms that encryption hides the plaintext when the de-
cryption key is unknown. The second equivalence does not hold as the test (dec(x1, x2)
=E a) holds on the left hand side, but not on the right hand side. Finally, the third
equivalence again holds as two restricted names are indistinguishable.
Now we are ready to define two classical equivalences on processes, based on the
labelled semantics: trace equivalence and labelled bisimulation.
Definition 4 (Trace equivalences ≈ct , ≈
p
t , ≈et). Let s ∈ {c, p, e}. Let A and B be two
closed honest extended processes. We say that A vst B if for all A
tr
=⇒s A′ such that
bn(tr) ∩ fn(B) = ∅, there exists B′ such that B tr=⇒s B′ and φ(A′) ∼ φ(B′). We say
that A ≈st B when A vst B and B vst A.
Definition 5 (Labeled bisimulations ≈c`, ≈
p
` , ≈e`). Let s ∈ {c, p, e}. Let A and B two
closed honest extended processes such that dom(A) = dom(B). We say that A ≈s` B
if ≈s` is the largest equivalence relation such that:
– φ(A) ∼ φ(B)
– A τ−→s A′ implies B
ε
=⇒s B′ and A′ ≈s` B′ for some B′,
– A `−→s A′ and bn(`) ∩ fn(B) = ∅ implies B
`
=⇒s B′ and A′ ≈s` B′ for some B′.
We again have, as usual that labelled bisimulation implies trace equivalence.
Proposition 3. ≈s` ( ≈st for s ∈ {c, e, p}.
In [1] it is shown that ≈co = ≈c`. We conjecture that for the new semantics p and
e this same equivalence holds as well. Re-showing these results is beyond the scope of
this paper, and we will mainly focus on testing/trace equivalence. As shown in [12], for
the classical semantics trace equivalence implies may testing, while the converse does
not hold in general. The two relations do however coincide on image-finite processes.
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Definition 6. Let A be a closed extended process. A is image-finite for the semantics
s ∈ {c, e, p} if for each trace tr the set of equivalence classes {φ(B) | A tr=⇒s B}/∼ is
finite.
Note that any replication-free process is necessarily image-finite as there are only a
finite number of possible traces for any given sequence of labels tr. The same relations
among trace equivalence and may testing shown for the classical semantics hold also
for the other semantics.
Theorem 1. ≈st ( ≈sm and ≈st = ≈sm on image-finite processes for s ∈ {c, e, p}.
The proof of this result (for the classical semantics) is given in [12] and is easily
adapted to the other semantics. To see that the implication is strict, we continue Ex-
ample 2 on processes A and B defined in Figure 2. We already noted that A ≈sm B,
but will now show that A 6≈st B (for s ∈ {c, e, p}). All possible traces of A are of
the form A
νx.out(c,x)
=======⇒s A′ where φ(A′) = {h
n(a)/x} for n ∈ N. We easily see that
A 6≈stB as for any n we have that {h
n(a)/x} 6∼ {s/x}, by testing x = hn(a). On the
other hand, given an image-finite process, we can only have a finite number of different
frames for a given trace, and therefore we can bound the context size that is necessary
for distinguishing the processes.
3 Comparing the different semantics
In this section we state our results on comparing these semantics. We first show that, as
expected, all the semantics coincide for reachability properties.
Theorem 2. For all ground, closed honest extended processesA, for all channels d, we
have that A pd iff A 
c
d iff A 
e
d.
The next result is, in our opinion, more surprising. As the private semantics force
the adversary to observe all information, one might expect that his distinguishing power
increases over the classical one. This intuition is however wrong: the classical and pri-
vate trace equivalences, testing equivalence and labelled bisimulations appear to be
incomparable.
Theorem 3. ≈pr 6⊆ ≈cr and ≈cr 6⊆ ≈pr for r ∈ {`, t,m}.
Proof. We first show that there exist A and B such that A ≈p` B, but A 6≈cm B. Note
that, as≈s` ⊂ ≈st ⊆ ≈sm for s ∈ {c, p} these processes demonstrate both that≈
p
` 6⊆ ≈c`,
≈pt 6⊆ ≈ct and ≈pm 6⊆ ≈cm.
Consider processes A and B defined in Figure 4. In short, the result follows from
the fact that if A performs an internal communication on channel c followed by an
output on d (from P1), B has no choice other then performing the output on d in P2.
In the private semantics, however, the internal communication will be split in an output
followed by an input: after the output on c, the input inho(c, x).P2(x) following the
output becomes available. More precisely, to see that A ≈p` B we first observe that if
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A =̂ νs1.νs2.((out
ho(c, s1).in
ho(c, x).P1(x)) | (inho(c, y).P2(y)))
B =̂ νs1.νs2.((out
ho(c, s1).in
ho(c, x).P2(x)) | (inho(c, y).P1(y)))
where
P1(x) =̂ (if x = s1 then out
ho(d, s2)) | (if x = s2 then outho(e, x))
P2(x) =̂ (if x = s1 then out
ho(d, s2))
To emit on channel e, processes A and B must execute P2(s1) followed by P1(s2). In the classi-
cal semantics, a trace ofA emitting on e through an internal communication between outho(c, s1)
and inho(c, y) forces B to execute P1(s1) thus preventing it to emit on e.
Fig. 4. Processes A and B such that A ≈p` B and A 6≈
c
m B.
A
νz.out(c,z)−−−−−−−→p A′ then B
νz.out(c,z)−−−−−−−→p B′ and A′ ≡ B′, and vice-versa. If A
in(c,t)−−−−→p
A′ then B
in(c,t)−−−−→p B′. As t 6∈ {s1, s2} we have that P1(t) ≈p` 0 ≈
p
` P2(t). Finally, if
t 6= s2 we also have that P1(t) ≈p` P2(t) as in particular P1(s1) ≈
p
` P2(s1). Therefore,
νs1.νs2.(out
ho(c, s1).in
ho(c, x).P1(x)) ≈p` νs1.νs2.(outho(c, s1).in
ho(c, x).P2(x))
which allows us to conclude.
As A and B are image-finite, we have that A ≈cm B if and only if A ≈ct B. To see
that A 6≈ct B we observe that A may perform the following transition sequence, starting
with an internal communication on a public channel:
A
τ−→c νs1.νs2.((inho(c, x).P1(x)) | (P2(s1)))
νz.out(d,z)
=======⇒c νs1.νs2.((inho(c, x).P1(x)) | {s2/z})
in(c,z)−−−−→c νs1.νs2.(P1(s2) | {s2/z})
In order to mimic the behaviour ofA,B must perform the same sequence of observable
transitions:
B
νz.out(d,z) in(c,z)
===========⇒c νs1.νs2.(P2(s2) | {s2/z})
We conclude as νs1.νs2.(P1(s2) | {s2/z})
νz′.out(e,z′)−−−−−−−−→ νs1.νs2.({s2/z} | {s2/z′}),
but νs1.νs2.(P2(s2) | {s2/z}) 6
νz′.out(e,z′)−−−−−−−−→. This trace inequivalence has also been
shown using APTE.
To show that ≈cr 6⊆ ≈pr for r ∈ {`, t,m} we show that there exist processes A
and B such that A ≈c` B and A 6≈pm B. As in the first part of the proof, note that, as
≈s` ⊂ ≈st ⊆ ≈sm for s ∈ {c, p} these processes demonstrate that ≈c` 6⊆ ≈
p
` , ≈ct 6⊆ ≈
p
t
and ≈cm 6⊆ ≈pm.
Consider the processes A and B defined in Figure 5. The proof crucially relies on
the fact that B may perform an internal communication in the classical semantics to
mimic A, which becomes visible in the attacker in the private semantics. To see that
A ≈c` B we first observe that the only first possible action from A or B is an in-
put. In particular, given a term t, there is a unique B′ such that B
in(c,t)−−−−→ B′ where
B′ = νs.(outho(c, s).outho(d, a) | inho(c, y).P (y)). However, if A in(c,t)−−−−→ A′ then
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A =̂ νs.(inho(c, x).outho(c, s).outho(d, a) | inho(c, y).P (y))
B =̂ νs.(inho(c, x).(outho(c, s).outho(d, a) | inho(c, y).P (y)))
where
P (y) =̂ if y = s then inho(c, z).outho(c, s).outho(d, a) else outho(d, a)
In the private semantics, a trace ofA starting with the execution of inho(c, y) can only be matched
on B by executing inho(c, x). B could then emit on channel c, which is not the case for A,
hence yielding non equivalence. In the classic semantics, an internal communication between
outho(c, s) and inho(c, y) allows to hide the fact that B can emit on c.
Fig. 5. Processes A and B such that A ≈c` B and A 6≈pm B.
either A′ = B′ or A′ = A′′ with A′′ =̂ νs.(inho(c, x).outho(c, s).outho(d, a) | P (t)).
Therefore, to complete the proof, we only need to find B′′ such that B
in(c,t)
====⇒ B′′ and
A′′ ≈c` B′′. Such process can be obtain by applying an internal communication on B′,
i.e. B
in(c,t)−−−−→c B′
τ−→ νs.(outho(d, a) | P (s)). Note that t 6= s since s is bound, mean-
ing that P (t) ≈c` outho(d, a). Moreover, P (s) ≈c` in
ho(c, x).outho(c, s).outho(d, a).
This allows us to conlude that νs.(outho(d, a) | P (s)) ≈c` A′′.
Again, as A and B are image-finite may and trace equivalence coincide. To see that
A 6≈pt B we first observe that A may perform the following transition sequence:
A
in(c,t)−−−−→p A′′
τ−→p νs.(inho(c, x).outho(c, s).outho(d, a) | outho(d, a))
νz.out(d,z)−−−−−−−→p νs.(inho(c, x).outho(c, s).outho(d, a) | {a/z})
We conclude as B
in(c,t)−−−−→p B′ but B′ 6
νz.out(d,z)−−−−−−−→p. This trace disequivalence has also
been shown using APTE. ut
One may also note that the counter-example witnessing that equivalences in the
private semantics do not imply equivalences in the classical semantics is minimal: it
does not use function symbols, equational reasoning, private channels, replication nor
else branches. The second part of the proof relies on the use of else branches. We can
however refine this result in the case of labeled bisimulation to processes without else
branches, the counter-example being the same processesA andB described in the proof
but where we replace each outho(d, a) by 0. In the case of trace equivalence, we can
also produce a counter-example without else branches witnessing that trace equiva-
lences in the classical semantics do no imply trace equivalences in the private seman-
tics but provided that we rely on a function symbol h. In the appendix of the technical
report [7],we describe in more details these processes and give the proofs of them being
counter-examples.
Next, we show that the eavesdropping semantics yields strictly stronger bisimula-
tions and trace equivalences: the eavesdropping semantics is actually strictly included
in the intersection of the classic and private semantics.
Theorem 4. ≈e` ( ≈
p
` ∩ ≈c`.
Proof (Sketch).
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A =̂ νs1.νs2.((out
ho(c, s1).in
ho(c, x).P1(x)) | (inho(c, y).P2(y)))
B =̂ νs1.νs2.((out
ho(c, s1).in
ho(c, x).P2(x)) | (inho(c, y).P1(y)))
where
P1(x) =̂ (if x = s1 then in
ho(d, z).if z = s1 then out
ho(d, s2)) | (if x = s2 then outho(e, x))
P2(x) =̂ (if x = s1 then in
ho(d, z).if z = s1 then out
ho(d, s2))
To emit on channel e, processes A and B must execute P2(s1) by inputing twice s1 followed
by P1(s2). In the classical semantics, an internal communication on A between outho(c, s1)
and inho(c, y) forces B to execute P1(s1) but hides s1, preventing a second input of s1 by A.
However, in the eavesdropping semantics, the internal communication reveals s1 allowing A to
emit on e but not B.
Fig. 6. Processes A and B such that A ≈c` B, A ≈p` B but A 6≈
e
t B.
1. We first show that ≈e` ⊆ ≈
p
` . Suppose A≈e`B and let R be the relation witnessing
this equivalence. We will show that R is also a labelled bisimulation in the private
semantics. Suppose ARB.
– as A≈e`B, we have that φ(A) ∼ φ(B).
– if A τ−→p A′ then, as
τ−→p⊂
τ−→e, A
τ−→e A′. As A≈e`B there exists B′ such that
B
ε
=⇒e B′ and A′RB′. As B is a honest process no COMM-EAV transition is
possible, and hence B ε=⇒p B′.
– if A `−→p A′ and bn(`) ∩ fn(B) = ∅ then we also have that A
`−→e A′
(as `−→p⊂
`−→e and there exists B′ such that B
`
=⇒e B′ and A′RB′. As no
COMM-EAV are possible and ` is not of the form eav(c, d) nor νy.eav(c, y)
we have that B `=⇒p B′.
2. We next show that A ≈e` B implies A ≈c` B for any A,B. We will show that ≈e` is
also a labelled bisimulation in the classical semantics. The proof relies on similar
arguments as in Item 2 of the proof of Theorem 5 and the facts that
– νñ.(A′ | {t/x}) ≈e` νñ.(B′ | {u/x}) implies νñ.A′ ≈e` νñ.B′,
– A′ ≈e` B′ implies νc.A′ ≈e` νc.B′
The first property is needed when an internal communication of a term or public
channel is replaced by an eavesdrop action and an input. The second property han-
dles the case when we replace the internal communication of a private channel by
an application of the EAV-OCH rule and an input.
3. We now show that the implication ≈e` ( ≈c` ∩≈ct is strict, i.e., there exist A and B
such that A ≈c` B, A ≈
p
` B but A 6≈et B (which implies A 6≈e` B).
Consider the processesA andB defined in Figure 6. This example is a variant of the
one given in Figure 4. The difference is the addition of “inho(d, z).if z = s1 then ”
in processes P1(x) and P2(x): this additional check is used to verify whether the
adversary learned s1 or not. The proofs that A ≈c` B and A ≈
p
` B follow the same
lines as in Theorem 3. We just additionally observe that νs1.(inho(d, z).if z =
s1 then out
ho(d, s2)) ≈s` νs1. (in
ho(d, z).0) for s ∈ {c, p}.
The trace witnessing that A 6≈et B (which implies A 6≈e` B) is again similar to
the one in Theorem 3, but starting with an eavesdrop transition which allows the
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attacker to learn s1, which in turn allows him to learn s2 and distinguish P1(s2)
from P2(s2). We have verified A 6≈et B using APTE which implies A 6≈e` B. ut
Again we note that the implications are strict, even for processes containing only
public channels.
Theorem 5. ≈et ( ≈
p
t ∩ ≈ct .
Proof (Sketch).
1. We first prove that ≈et ⊆ ≈
p
t . Suppose that A ≈et B. We need to show that for
any A′ such that A tr=⇒p A′ there exists B′ such that B
tr
=⇒p B′. It follows from
the definition of the semantics that whenever A tr=⇒p A′ then we also have A
tr
=⇒e
A′ as `−→p ⊂
`−→e. As A ≈et B, we have that there exists B′, such that B
tr
=⇒e
B′ and φ(A′) ∼ φ(B′). As tr does not contain labels of the form eav(c, d) nor
νy.eav(c, y) and as no COMM-EAV are possible (A and B are honest processes)
we also have that B tr=⇒p B′. Hence A ≈pt B.
2. We next prove that ≈et ⊆ ≈ct . Similar to Item 1 we suppose that A ≈et B and
A
trc==⇒c A′c. From the semantics, we obtain that A
tre==⇒e A′e, where
– φ(A′c) ⊆ φ(A′e), i.e., dom(φ(A′c)) ⊆ dom(φ(A′e)) and the frames coincide on
the common domain.
– tre is constructed from tr by replacing any τ action resulting from the COMM
rule by an application of an eavesdrop rule (EAV-T, EAV-CH, or EAV-OCH).
The proof is done by induction on the length of tr and the proof tree of each tran-
sition. As A ≈et B we also have that B
tre==⇒e B′e and A′e ∼ B′e. We show by
the definition of the semantics that B trc==⇒c B′c and φ(B′c) ⊆ φ(B′e) (replacing
each eavesdrop action by an internal communication). Due to the inclusions of the
frames and A′e ∼ B′e we also have that A′c ∼ B′c.
3. To show that the implication ≈et ( ≈
p
t ∩ ≈ct is strict, i.e., there exist processes A
and B such that A ≈ct B, A ≈
p
t B but A 6≈et B. The processes defined in Figure 6
witness this fact (cf the discussion of these processes in the proof of Theorem 4).
These trace (in)equivalences have also been verified using APTE.
We note from the processes defined in Figure 6 that the implications are strict even
for processes that do not communicate on private channels, do not use replication, nor
else branches and terms are simply names (no function symbols nor equational theo-
ries).
Theorem 6. ≈em ( ≈pm ∩ ≈cm.
Proof (Sketch).
1. We first prove that ≈em ⊆ ≈pm. Suppose that A ≈em B. Suppose that A ≈em B.
We need to show that for all channel c, for all C[ ] attacker evaluation contexts
p-closing for A and B, C[A] ⇓pc is equivalent to C[B] ⇓pc . It follows from the
definition of the private semantics that any process eav(c, x).P inC[ ] has the same
behaviour as the process 0. Hence, we generate a context C1[ ] by replacing in C[ ]
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any instance of eav(c, x).P by 0, and thus obtaining C[A] ⇓pc ⇔ C ′[A] ⇓pc and
C[B] ⇓pc ⇔ C ′[B] ⇓pc . Notice that the definition of semantics gives us→p ⊆ →e.
Hence, C ′[A] ⇓pc implies C ′[A] ⇓ec and C ′[B] ⇓pc implies C ′[B] ⇓ec. Furthermore,
since we built C ′[ ] to not contain any process of the form eav(c, x).P , we deduce
that rules C-EAV and C-OEAV can never be applied in a derivation of C ′[A] or
C ′[B]. It implies that C ′[A] ⇓pc⇔ C ′[A] ⇓ec and C ′[B] ⇓pc⇔ C ′[B] ⇓ec. Thanks to
A ≈em B, we know thatC ′[A] ⇓ec ⇔ C ′[B] ⇓ec and so we conclude thatC[A] ⇓pc ⇔
C[B] ⇓pc .
2. We next prove that ≈em ⊆ ≈cm. Similarly to Item 1, we consider a channel c and
an attacker evaluation context C[ ] that is c-closing for A and B. The main diffi-
culty of this proof is to match the application of the rule COMM in the classical
semantics with the rules C-EAV and C-OEAC. However, C[ ] does not necessar-
ily contain eavesdrop process eav(d, x) | ωc. Moreover, as mentioned in Item 1, a
process eav(d, x).P has the same behavior as 0 in the classical semantics but can
have a completely different behaviour in the eavesdropping semantics if P is not
0. Thus, we remove from C[ ] the eavesdrop processes, obtaining C ′[ ]. Then, we
define a new context C ′′[ ] based on C ′[ ] where will add harmless eavesdrop pro-
cess eav(d, y).0. We first add in parallel the processes !eav(a, y) | ωa for all free
channels a in C ′[ ], A and B. Moreover, since private channels can be opened,
we also replace any process νd.P , inat(c, x).P where d, x are of channel type
with νd.(P |!eav(d, y)) and inat(c, x).(P |!eav(x, y)). By induction of the deriva-
tions, we can show that C[A] ⇓cc ⇔ C ′′[A] ⇓ec and C[B] ⇓cc ⇔ C ′′[B] ⇓ec. Since
A ≈em B, we deduce that C ′′[A] ⇓ec ⇔ C ′′[B] ⇓ec and so C[A] ⇓cc ⇔ C[B] ⇓cc.
3. To show that the implication ≈em ( ≈pm ∩ ≈cm is strict, i.e., there exist processes
A and B such that A ≈cm B, A ≈pm B but A 6≈em B. The processes defined in
Figure 6 witness this fact. They already were witness of the strict inclusion ≈et (
≈pt ∩ ≈ct (see proof of Theorem 5) and since A and B are image finit, we know
from Theorem 1 that may and trace equivalences between A and B coincide. ut
≈s` ≈so
≈st
≈sm
for all s ∈ {c, p, e}
for image finite processes ≈st = ≈sm
if s = c then ≈s` = ≈so (conjectured for s ∈ {p, e})
≈cr ≈er ≈pr
for all r ∈ {m, t, `}
Fig. 7. Overview of the results.
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4 Subclasses of processes for which the semantics coincide
4.1 Simple processes
The class of simple processes was defined in [12]. It was shown that for these processes
observational and may testing equivalences coincide. Intuitively, these processes are
composed of parallel basic processes. Each basic process is a sequence of input, test on
the input and output actions. Moreover, importantly, each basic process has a distinct
channel for communication.
Definition 7 (basic process). The setB(c,V) of basic processes built on c ∈ Ch and V ⊆
X (variables of base type) is the least set of processes that contains 0 and such that
– if B1, B2 ∈ B(c,V), M,N ∈ T (F ,N ,V), then
if M = N then B1 else B2 ∈ B(c,V).
– if B ∈ B(c,V), u ∈ T (F ,N ,V), then outho(c, u).B ∈ B(c,V).
– if B ∈ B(c,V ] {x}), x of base type (x /∈ V), then inho(c, x).B ∈ B(c,V).
Definition 8 (simple process). A simple process is obtained by composing and repli-
cating basic processes and frames, hiding some names:
νñ. ( νñ1.(B1 | σ1) | !(νc′1, m̃1.outho(p1, c′1).B′1)
...
...
νñk.(Bk | σk) | !(νc′n, m̃n.outho(pn, c′n).B′n) )
where Bj ∈ B(cj , ∅), B′j ∈ B(c′j , ∅) and cj are channel names that are pairwise
distinct. The names p1, . . . , pn are distinct channel names that do not appear elsewhere
and σ1, . . . , σk are frames without restricted names (i.e. substitutions).
We have that for simple processes, all equivalences and semantics coincide.
Theorem 7. When restricted to simple processes, we have that ≈s1r1 = ≈
s2
r2 for r1, r2 ∈
{`, o,m, t} and s1, s2 ∈ {c, p, e}.
Proof. The result when s1 = s2 = c was shown in [12]. As for simple processes, all
parallel processes have distinct channels, the internal communication rule may never be
triggered, and therefore it is easy to show that the three semantics coincide.
4.2 I/O-unambiguous processes
Restricting processes to simple processes is often too restrictive. For instance, when ver-
ifying unlinkability and anonymity properties, two outputs by different parties should
not be distinguishable due to the channel name. We therefore introduce another class
of processes, that we call io-unambiguous for which we also show that the different
semantics (although not the different equivalences) do coincide.
Intuitively, an io-unambiguous process forbids an output and input on the same pub-
lic channel to follow each other directly (or possibly with only conditionals in between).
For instance, we forbid processes of the form outθ(c, t).inθ(c, x).P , outθ(c, t).(inθ(c, x).
P | Q) as well as outθ(c, t).if t1 = t2 then P else inθ(c, x).Q. We however allow
inputs and outputs on the same channel in parallel.
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Definition 9. We define an honest extended process A to be I/O-unambiguous when
ioua(A, ) = > where
ioua(0, c) = > ioua({u/x}, c) = > ioua(!P, c) = ioua(P, c)
ioua(A | B, c) = ioua(A, c) ∧ ioua(B, c) ioua(νx.A, c) = ioua(A, c)
ioua(νn.A, c) =
{
⊥ if n ∈ Ch
ioua(A, c) otherwise
ioua(if u = v then P else Q, c) = ioua(P, c) ∧ ioua(Q, c)
ioua(outθ(d, u).P, c) =
{
⊥ if u is of channel type
ioua(P, d) otherwise
ioua(inθ(d, x).P, c) =
{
⊥ if x is of channel type or d = c
ioua(P, ) otherwise
Note that an I/O-unambiguous process does not contain private channels and always
input/output base-type terms. We also note that a simple way to enforce that processes
are I/O-unambiguous is to use disjoint channel names for inputs and outputs (at least in
the same parallel thread).
Theorem 8. When restricted to I/O-unambiguous processes, we have that ≈pr = ≈er
but ≈er ( ≈cr for r ∈ {`, t}.
Proof. From Theorems 4 and 5, we already know that ≈er ⊆ ≈pr and ≈er ⊆ ≈cr. Hence,
we only need to show that ≈pr ⊆ ≈er and ≈pr ( ≈cr. The latter is easily shown by
noticing that the processes A and B in Figure 5 are I/O-unambiguous. Thus, we focus
on ≈pr ⊆ ≈er.
We start by proving that for all I/O-unambiguous processes A, for all A tr=⇒ A′,
we have that A′ is I/O-unambiguous. Note that structural equivalence preserves I/O-
unambiguity, i.e. for all extended processes A,B, for all channel name c, A ≡ B im-
plies ioua(A, c) = ioua(B, c). Hence, we assume w.l.o.g. that a name is bound at most
once and the set of bound and free names are disjoint.
Second, we show that for all I/O-unambiguous processesA, for allA
νz.out(c,z).in(c,z)
===========⇒p
A′, we have that
νz.eav(c,z)
=======⇒e A′. To prove this property, denoted P , let us assume
w.l.o.g. that A
νz.out(c,z)−−−−−−−→p A1 →∗p A2
in(c,z)−−−−→p A′. The transition A
νz.out(c,z)−−−−−−−→p A1
indicates that A ≡ νñ.(outho(c, u).P | Q) and A1 ≡ ñ.(P | Q | {u/z}) for some
P,Q, ñ, c, u. Note that A is I/O-unambiguous, and hence ioua(P, c) = >.
As A is I/O-unambiguous implies that A does not contain private channels, we
have that the rule applied in A1 →∗p A2 is either the rule THEN or ELSE. There-
fore, there exists P ′ and Q′ such that P →∗p P ′, Q →∗p Q′, An ≡ νñ.(P ′ | Q′ |
{u/x}) and ioua(P ′, c) = >. Hence, we deduce that there exists Q1, Q2 such that
Q′ ≡ νm̃.(in.(c, x)Q1 | Q2) and A′ ≡ νñ.νm̃.(P ′ | Q1{u/x} | Q2). We conclude
the proof of this property by noticing that we can first apply on A the reduction rules of
Q→∗p Q′, then apply the rule C-EAV and finally apply the rules of P →∗p P ′.
1. To prove ≈pt ⊆ ≈et , we assume that A,B are two closed honest extended processes
such that A ≈pt B. For all A
tr
=⇒e A′, it follows from the semantics that A
trp
=⇒p A′
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where trp is obtained by replacing in tr each νz.eav(c, z) by νz.out(c, z).in(c, z).
Since A ≈pt B, there exists B′ such that B
trp
=⇒p B′ and φ(A′) ∼ φ(B′). Thanks to
the property P , we conclude that B tr=⇒e B′.
2. To prove ≈p` ⊆ ≈e`, we assume that A,B are two closed honest extended processes
such that A ≈p` B and let R be the relation witnessing this equivalence. We will
show thatR is also a labelled bisimulation in the eavesdropping semantics. Suppose
ARB.
– as A ≈p` B, we have that φ(A) ∼ φ(B).
– if A τ−→e A′ then, as A is honest, A
τ−→p A′. As A ≈p` B there exists B′ such
that B ε=⇒p B′ and A′RB′. As
τ−→p ⊂
τ−→e, B
ε
=⇒e B′
– if A `−→e A′ then, as A is I/O-unambiguous, A
tr
=⇒e A′ where tr = νz.out(c, z).
in(c, z) when ` = νz.eav(c, z) else tr = `. As A ≈p` B, there exists B′
such that B tr=⇒p B′ and A′RB′. When tr = `, the definition of the semantics
directly gives us B `=⇒e B′. When tr = νz.out(c, z).in(c, z), the property P
gives us B `=⇒e B′. ut
5 Different semantics in practice
As we have seen, in general, the three proposed semantics may yield different results. A
conservative approach would consist in verifying always the eavesdropping semantics
which is stronger than the two other ones, as shown before. However, this semantics
seems also to be the least efficient one to verify.
We have implemented the three different semantics in the APTE tool, for processes
with static channels, i.e. inputs and outputs may only have names in the channel po-
sition and not variables. This allowed us to investigate the difference in results and
performance between the semantics.
In our experiments we considered several examples from APTE’s repository:
– the Private Authentication protocol proposed by Abadi and Fournet [2];
– the passive authentication protocol implemented in the European Passport proto-
col [16, 4];
– the French and UK versions of the Basic Access Protocol (BAC) implemented in
the European passport [16, 5].
For all these examples we found that the results, i.e., whether trace equivalence holds or
not, was unchanged, independent of the semantics. However, as expected, performance
of the private semantics was generally better. The existing protocol encodings gener-
ally used a single public channel. To enforce I/O-unambiguity, we introduced different
channels and, surprisingly, noted that distinct channels significantly enhance the tool’s
performance. (The model using different channels in the case of RFID protocols such
as the electronic passport is certainly questionable.)
The results are summarised in the following table. For each protocol we considered
the original encoding, and a slightly changed one which enforces I/O-unambiguity. In
the results column we mark an attack by a cross (×) and a successful verification with
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a check mark (X). In case of an attack we generally considered the minimal number of
sessions needed to find the attack. In case of a successful verification we consider more
sessions, which is the reason for the much higher verification times.
Protocol # sessions Property Time Result≈et ≈ct ≈
p
t
Private Authentication 1
Anonymity
1s 1s 1s
X
2 53h 53m 20s 47h 46m 40s 46h 56m 40s
I/O unambiguous 1 1s 1s 1s2 31m 39s 21m 2s 19m 39s
Passive Authentication 2
Anonymity
4s 3s 3s
XI/O unambiguous 2 4s 4s 3s3 6h 38m 34s 6h 29m 24s 6h 36m 40s
Passive Authentication 2
Unlinkability
4s 4s 3s
XI/O unambiguous 2 3s 3s 3s3 7h 43m 2s 6h 39m 14s 4h 27m 47s
FR BAC protocol 2 Unlinkability 1s 1m 29s 1s ×I/O unambiguous 2 1s 1s 1s
UK BAC protocol 2 Unlinkability 1h 2m 35s ? 6h 39m 14s ×I/O unambiguous 2 4s 53s 2s
6 Conclusion
In this paper we investigated two families of Dolev-Yao models, depending on how the
hypothesis that the attacker controls the network is reflected. While the two seman-
tics coincide for reachability properties, they yield incomparable notions of behavioral
equivalences, which have recently been extensively used to model privacy properties.
The fact that forcing all communication to be routed through the attacker may diminish
his distinguishing power may at first seem counter-intuitive. We also propose a third
semantics, where internal communication among honest participants is permitted but
leaks the message to the attacker. This new communication semantics entails strictly
stronger equivalences than the two classical ones. We also identify two subclasses of
protocols for which (some) semantics coincide. Finally, we implemented the three se-
mantics in the APTE tool. Our experiments showed that the three semantics provide the
same result on the case studies in the APTE example repository. However, the private
semantics is slightly more efficient, as less interleavings have to be considered. Our
results illustrate that behavioral equivalences are much more subtle than reachability
properties and the need to carefully choose the precise attacker model.
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